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Introduction
Many African countries have known armed insurgency, civil unrest 
and instability for many years. Among these countries are Mauritania, Mali, 
Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, Congo, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, 
Djibouti, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the CAR 
(Joseph 2012, 23-25; Cilliers and Schünemann 2013, 9-10).  In sub-Saharan 
Africa, in general, military power between state and insurgency appears to 
be shifting often in favour of the latter which has forced African states to 
deploy forces more frequently beyond their borders (Howe 2001, 1). In the 
case of Ethiopia, for instance, the government has been at running battles 
with the Oromo for a long time and in Somalia, the brutalities of the Al-
Shabaab are well known including also sea piracy which made the Horn of 
Africa insecure to sea-going vessels. All these have threatened peace and 
security in the Horn of Africa and beyond. In Nigeria, the Boko Haram 
insurgency in the North East of the country bordering Cameroon and Chad 
and activities of armed militias in the Niger Delta have threatened the peace 
and unity of this colossus of Africa. In the Central African sub-region, to 
which is located the CAR, wars and conflicts like in the DRC and Chad 
have created unfavourable socio-political and economic conditions. There 
is also a proliferation of internal and inter-state violence in the sub-region, 
especially in countries like the CAR, Chad and the DRC. In fact, recurrent 
political crises and military hostilities have kept the central African sub-
region continuously in the headlines in the 21st century (Mwanasali 1999, 
90-91; Frère 2010, 1).




The Central African Republic (CAR), which is the focus of this study, 
is a member of the Economic and Monetary Community of the Central 
African States, known by its French acronym as CEMAC. It is also a member 
state of the Economic Community of the Central African States (ECCAS). 
This country is very rich in natural resources, notably in diamond, gold, 
copper, uranium and timber. The population of the country is estimated at 
4.5 million (Miles 2013). In terms of population configuration, the CAR is 
an amalgamation of various ethnic groups. The Gbaya people sought refuge 
from the Fulani of Northern Cameroon by migrating into the CAR in the 
early 19th century, while the Banda who fled the Muslim Arab slave raids of 
Sudan followed the Gbaya later in the century. The country generally has 
over 80 ethnic groups, each with its own language and cultural practices. 
The largest ethnic groups of the country include the Gbaya 33%, Banda 
27%, Mandjia 13%, Sara 10%, Mboum 7%, M’Baka 4% and Yakoma 4%. 
Other smaller ethnic groups make up the remaining 2% of the population. 
There are different religious groups in the country. Of these religious 
groups, 35% of the population is inclined to indigenous beliefs, 25% adhere 
to Protestantism and another 25% are Catholics while about 15% are profess 
the Muslim religion (Alusala 2007, 11).
In terms of the standards of living in Africa, the CAR has one 
of the lowest in spite of its rich natural endowments. In the domain of 
infrastructure, the road network of the country is not regularly maintained 
and some communities suffer a chronic shortage of drinking water. The 
country is also politically unstable, corruption and highway robbery are rife 
and the economic climate is uncertain, attracting little foreign investment. 
In a general sense, the CAR has  insufficient functioning state institutions, 
an economy in shambles, an impoverished population and a security 
apparatus in complete disarray (N’Ddiaye 2007, 1; Central African Republic 
Country Level Information; Country Profile Central African Republic). 
These problems combined together have made the country vulnerable to 
armed insurgency and instability in the Central African sub-region, giving 
rise to intervention and interference of various forms from gullible and self-
seeking neighbouring states.
In this study we examine the road to the Séléka overthrow of the 
government of Bozizé in March 2013 and the departure of Michel Djotodia, 
who was replaced by Catherine Samba-Panza in January 2014. This is one 
out of many insurgencies that have taken place in the country since its 
independence in August 1960. The historical roots of the instability and 
disintegration in the country are examined to show that CAR, from its 
creation, had problems and these have manifested themselves in fratricidal 
war times and again in the territory. The study also examines the grievances 
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of the Séléka insurgents, the challenges of the new Séléka led government 
and that of the present care-taker government of Catherine Samba-Panza. 
All of these, if not carefully handled, is still likely to plunge the country 
further into chaos, as was the case before the armed insurrection of March 
2013 and subsequent military and counter military reprisals.
This study is significant in several ways. The fact that the CAR 
has been in the news for its instability, leadership crisis, coups and armed 
insurrection needs a study to unravel the factors that have been responsible 
for this. It is a country rich in natural resources, such as timber, gold, copper 
and diamond, but paradoxically one of the poorest in the world. The saga in 
the country only confirms the resource curse that has characterised countries 
with vast natural resources like Nigeria and Angola. A study of this country 
is a contribution to this theory of resource curse that has characterised 
many African countries blessed with natural resources. Again, the study 
is important because the continuous instability of the CAR is an indication 
of either the failure or inability of ECCAS and CEMAC to establish peace 
and stability in the country. Rather, the country has been drawn into serious 
conflicts with two members of these blocs, namely Chad and the DRC. If 
these regional groupings are unable to tackle this instability it is even more 
challenging for the African Union (AU) to achieve continental unity, peace 
and stability in Africa. An understanding of the Séléka insurgency in the 
CAR could be traced from the historical roots of the country. 
Historical roots of instability
 The root of crisis and instability in the Central African sub-region as 
a whole was a result of the French policy of assimilation which became the 
guiding principle for colonial administration. Forje (2005, 228) argues that 
the politics of assimilation pursued by the French in the Central African 
sub-region was seen as a betrayal of national sovereignty. This betrayal of 
sovereignty was compounded by the governing elite that emerged because 
they converted this into a new form of hegemony. This manifested itself 
in the form of the transfer of state property into personal/private property, 
the ethnicisation of the state and the creation of a family dynasty as the 
legitimate source of succession. Forje also argues that the sovereignty of the 
people of this sub-region was greedily hijacked by this few privileged elite. 
They instituted the politics of exclusion in place of inclusion. The result of 
this kind of policy after independence plunged the Central African region 
into turmoil. The creation of the CAR from the period of colonisation to 
independence, in 1960, witnessed a manifestation of hegemonic tendencies 
in different ways and at different times. 
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The numerous crises in the CAR have their roots in the history 
of the country from the past to its independence on 13 August 1960 from 
France. French colonial administration and the Arab slave trade in the area 
contributed negatively to the future stability of the country. The territory was 
initially organised in 1894 as the colony of Ubangi-Shari and subsequently 
united administratively with Chad in 1905. In 1910 the territory was 
incorporated into the French Equatorial Africa (Afrique Equatoriale Française, 
AEF) which was a federation of three colonies namely Gabon, Middle 
Congo (Moyen Congo) and Ubangi-Shari-Chad. Four years later, Chad was 
separated from the Ubangi-Shari colony and made a separate territory. The 
Ubangi-Shari as the CAR was called at the time, received less attention and 
resources from France than the other AEF territories namely present day 
Republic of Congo, Gabon and Chad. Rather, thousands of its population 
was forced to work on infrastructure projects elsewhere in AEF and this 
was of little benefit to the territory. Besides, the Arab slave trade raids from 
present day Chad and the Sudan resulted in the decline in the population of 
large areas of the CAR. This eventually had an effect on development and 
the ethnic and religious tensions in the country today (Alusala 2007, 11; 
Berman and Lombard 2008, 3).  
French colonial administration and the Arab slave trade raids 
laid the basis of the present mayhem in the CAR with ramifications on 
neighbouring countries like Chad and Sudan. The administration of 
the territory as an integral part of the AEF did not make the French to 
devote resources towards its own separate development. They channelled 
resources towards the development of other areas especially the Republic 
of Congo and Gabon at the expense of the people of the CAR. To make 
matters worse, the population was carted away to work on the infrastructure 
of other territories while their own infrastructure was unattended to. It 
remained poor and undeveloped throughout the period of French colonial 
administration. The joint administration of the CAR with Chad seemingly 
gave post-independence governments of Chad the justification to meddle in 
the internal affairs of the country and for armed groups from both countries 
to operate with impunity across their own borders and destabilise their 
governments. On the other hand, the Arab slave raids through the territory 
created a culture of aggression which now manifests itself in the present 
abductions or kidnappings, a common practice among belligerents in the 
struggle for the control of the CAR. The aftermath of the slave raids also 
led to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) that has 
continued to destabilise the CAR and its neighbours today.
Again, the colonial administration in Ubangi-Shari was 
underfinanced and mostly poorly trained. It also created a brutal and 
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authoritarian yet ineffectual regime in the country. This administration 
laid emphasis on cash-cropping like cotton and used coercive means to 
levy taxes on the population. Besides, diamond and gold mining which 
the French initiated in 1927 was a preserve of the Europeans who got the 
benefits from it (Bauters 2012, 9). At independence, the country was one 
of the poorest and underdeveloped. Its problems were compounded by the 
authoritarian governments of David Dacko and his successor Jean-Bedel 
Bokassa. Dacko and Bokassa who declared himself emperor established an 
authoritarian regime similar to that of the French during the colonial era. 
Dacko reinforced his grip on power through constitutional reforms in 1962 
and 1964. These reforms concentrated power in the hands of the executive 
branch of government and effectively removed the idea of political parties 
competing for power. The president banned independent trade unions in 
the country and censorship was tightened. On his hand Jean-Bedel Bokassa 
declared himself as “life President” in 1972 and emperor in 1977 (Polity IV 
Country 2010, 1; Bauters 2012, 10-12). Acting like the colonial government 
taxes on cotton farmers were increased making life very difficult for the 
peasants. The problems of the CAR can be understood against a backdrop 
of this ineffectual and autocratic administration of the French and the early 
leaders who ruled the CAR after it gained independence from France on 13 
August 1960.
The road to the independence of the CAR in August 1960 from 
French rule was in itself problematic and sowed seeds of discord for the 
political leadership of the country. The head of government during the 
transition period leading to independence Barthélemy Boganda, a former 
Catholic priest, preferred to lead his party, the Movement for the Social 
Evolution of Black Africa (MESAN) with his cousin David Dacko, who 
eventually became the first president of the CAR at independence on 13 
August 1960 after the death of Boganda in a plane crash. Another cousin 
of David Dacko who served under him as Army Chief of Staff Jean-Bedel 
Bokassa seized power from him through a coup (Alusala 2007, 12; Bauters 
2012, 10). The ethnicisation of leadership and governance in the CAR was 
also pursued by General André Kolingba when he seized power in 1981. 
During his tenure in office that lasted until 1993, he shamelessly filled 
the Forces armées centrafricaines (FACA) with members of his Yakoma 
ethnic group, one of the smallest in the country. Ange-Félix Patassé who 
succeeded Kolingba in 1993 compounded matters further when he created 
militia groups along ethnic lines to support his regime. These militias were 
composed of people mostly from the Sara, Kaba and Gbaya groups of his 
home region. Even General Françoise Bozizé’s administration from 2003 to 
2013 was accused of ethnic considerations in the leadership of the country 
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(A Widening War 2007, 3; Bauters 2012, 14). This was a precedent set by 
Boganda and energetically pursued by his successors who ruled the country 
after independence.
Road to the March 2013 military take-over
The road to the March 2013 Séléka seizure of power in the CAR can 
conveniently been traced from the multiparty elections of 1993. General 
André Kolingba who had ruled the CAR as private property from 1981 to 
1993 finally yielded to the will of the people and the wind of change that blew 
from the West across Africa. Although this election led to a change at the top 
of the state, it opened the door to civil unrest, army mutinies, instability and 
civil war in the country (Frère 2010, 2). His defeat in the general elections 
of 1993 laid the foundation for numerous coup attempts on the government 
of Ange-Félix Patassé and eventually to the March 2013 armed insurrection 
and defeat of the government of General François Bozizé. Between 1993 
and 2003 when Ange-Félix Patassé was overthrown by Bozizé and his men, 
seven coup attempts had been organised against his government. This was 
not a mere coincidence but a result of an unreliable system of governance 
that was put in place by leaders namely David Dacko, Jean-Bédel Bokassa and 
André Kolingba. This situation was also compounded by the very difficult 
economic situation that the CAR experienced in the 1990s following the 
world economic slump of the mid-1980s. 
When Patassé was democratically elected president of the CAR 
in 1993, he unfortunately followed the footsteps of André Kolingba by 
promoting ethnicity in state governance (Forje 2005, 227-228). During his 
reign Kolingba had embarked on a massive recruitment of the Yakoma, his 
ethnic group into the army. By the time he was defeated in the elections of 
1993, 70 % of the army was made up of the Yakoma who constitute only 
4 % of the population of the CAR. Instead of arresting this problem and 
giving the CAR a truly national character, Patassé rather accentuated it by 
exploiting his northern heritage for political gain. Ethnicisation of public 
space has been a common feature of countries of the Central African sub 
region (Fomin 2005, 167) since their political independence in the 1960s. 
This ethnicisation of governance compounded problems for the CAR by 
creating a rift between the Riverain and Savaniers as the people of the South 
and North were referred to. President Patassé redeployed the Yakoma and 
most Presidential Guards were from the Sara-Kaba ethnic group of the 
North.
 The overwhelming presence of the Yakoma in the military became 
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a source of instability for the government of Patassé between 1993 and 2003 
when his government was toppled by Bozizé (Polity IV Country Report 2010, 
3; Mehler 2009). In spite of this, the northern part of the CAR remained 
relatively underdeveloped under the presidency of Patassé who was from the 
North. The reform initiated by Patassé in the security services created a rift 
between the FACA, the regular army and the Presidential Guards leading to 
serious security problems for the country (Bauters 2012, 13). From 1991 to 
the overthrow of Patassé and Bozizé, the security forces of the CAR were as 
divided as never before. This is one of the problems that led to the attempt 
by Kolingba and Bozizé in 2001 and 2002 respectively to topple the Patassé 
regime and culminated in the defeat of Patassé’s forces in 2003. 
Although armed groups were in existence in the CAR from the 
late seventies and early eighties spanning from the government of Bokassa 
to Kolingba like the Mouvement centrafricain pour la liberation nationale 
(MCLN) of Rudolph Idi Lala, these were hardly considered as a pressing 
matter because firearms were scarce at the time. After the fall of Bokassa 
arms were being smuggled in from Chad and the number skyrocketed 
when the government of Hissène Habré was toppled in 1990. Many more 
arms were smuggled into the country after the fall of Mobutu in the DRC 
in 1997. As many arms were smuggled children were co-opted into fighting 
in the armed groups (Ayike 2005, 192; Organised Crime 2011, 7). President 
Patassé took over the mantle of leadership in the CAR when the number of 
arms and armed groups had increased in the country (Bauters 2012, 18). 
Many more armed groups emerged to challenge existing ones and also 
government forces creating a situation of insecurity and instability. Some 
of them were eager to control the natural resources of the different parts of 
the country. Patassé was therefore faced with the problem of handling the 
differences between the different military services and to suppress armed 
groups many of whom operated with foreign support from neighbouring 
countries like the DRC, Sudan and Chad. 
The military crisis in the CAR in 1996 was exacerbated by a serious 
political crisis which led to widespread public discontent over social and 
economic problems. Due to the prolonged non-payment of salary arrears 
of the soldiers, civilians were regularly attacked by the men in uniform 
(Internal Displacement 2007, 9; Taylor 2005, 241; IFAD Participation in 
the Debt Initiative 2008, 1). Even civil servants and government workers 
went through a decade of unpaid wages which compounded the socio-
political crises of the country from 1996 onwards (Central African Republic, 
Country Level Information). To protect himself and continue to lead the 
CAR, Patassé did not only enlist foreign support from Libya and the DRC 
but also created a personal armed group known as karako, meaning peanut 
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in the local Sango language (Mehler 2009; Bauters 2012, 13). The economic 
problems of the people were compounded by the devaluation of the franc 
CFA by 50% due to international pressure which only impoverished the 
population further (Berman 2008, 6). Their reaction in the mid-1990s was 
a descent into violence against the state which threatened its very existence 
and stability and made the government of Patassé vulnerable to several coup 
attempts throughout the period of his administration in the CAR.
The dismissal of General François Bozizé as Army Chief of Staff by 
President Patassé in 2001 made the sacked Chief of Staff to escape to Chad 
and mobilise forces against him with the view of assuming the mantle of 
leadership in the country. Bozizé escaped to Chad with several hundreds of 
troops loyal to him. They were all determined to bring the government of 
Patassé to its knees (War Crimes 2003, 36). While in Chad he enlisted the 
support of several armed groups in the northern part of the CAR and was 
also given assistance by the Chadian government for strategic reasons. One 
of these reasons was to, presumably, secure the oil fields of Chad and make 
the border with the CAR safe for Chad’s economic and other interests. 
Had Patassé not out rightly dismissed Bozizé, his government might have 
survived beyond the 2003 military take-over that was commandeered by 
Bozizé. He might also have successfully organised another election apart of 
the one of 1999 to ensure a peaceful transfer of power and the consolidation 
of democracy in the country. Unable to withstand the incessant armed 
attacks of the Bozizé rebel group, Patassé’s men yielded to defeat when they 
were overpowered by those of Bozizé with assistance from Chadians. The 
presidential palace fell to Bozizé when President Patassé was in a meeting 
of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (COMESA) summit in Niger 
(Mehler 2009). Upon his return from this summit, the president could not 
land and was forced to fly to Cameroon and finally took exile in Togo. 
Other things which led to mounting hatred for the Patassé 
government included widespread mismanagement and self-enrichment 
by the ruling elite of the country. There was also the outright buying of 
members of parliament and exclusion of formerly privileged groups like the 
Yakoma under the previous government of André Kolingba (Mehler 2009). 
These grievances of the people formed the basis for the army mutinies of 
1996/97, the coup attempts of 2001/2002 and the successful rebellion of 
2003 that saw power change hands from Patassé to Bozizé. The common 
citizen could not understand why public resources could be mismanaged and 
the privileged enriched themselves when they did not have basic amenities 
like water and electricity. The government of Patassé could also not have 
survived an armed insurrection against it because of the policy of exclusion 
and selective treatment that it adopted. This policy pitted many other groups 
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from the South against those from the North. This was the first time that 
someone from the North was the leader of the country (Country Profile 
2007, 4) and people from the densely populated North-West impoverished 
region expected improvements in their region which were not forthcoming. 
The northern part of the CAR that expected much from a president 
who hailed from their region developed misgivings with the Patassé’s 
government. President Patassé had in an attempt to counter the cross-
border raids of Bozizé’s men in the North and coupeurs de route syndrome 
set up a special force outside the regular army to handle these threats from 
the North. It was led by Colonel Abdoulaye Miskine, a former commando 
in Chad. This special force of mercenaries was a mixed bunch with some 
having links with former President Hissène Habre and others to Goukouni 
Queiddeye. They committed serious atrocities on the population in the North 
as was reported by local human rights organisations (Bauters 2012, 13; War 
Crimes 2003, 36; Ghura 2004, 14). Opponents of the government criticised 
it for excesses in the North of the country and especially Colonel Miskine 
who had Chadian connections. It was however a difficult task to tackle the 
problems of the coupeurs des routes and the armed attacks orchestrated by 
Bozizé and his men because of the porous borders of this region and its 
numerous armed groups operating across the borders of Sudan and Chad, 
countries with a very long history of civil wars. Bozizé became president 
through seizure of power but soon after he ran into problems with his 
supporters which explain why there was opposition to his administration 
leading to an insurgency and defeat.
Séléka insurgency December 2012 to March 2013
The Séléka insurgency of March 24 2013 and change of leadership 
from François Bozizé to Michel Am Nondroko Djotodia was due to several 
factors dating back to peace talks with the government in 2007. The word 
Séléka is sango word for union or alliance, that is, a coalition of about five 
separate rebel groups which include the Union des forces démocratiques pour 
le rassemblement (UFDR), the Convention des patriots pour la justice et la paix 
(CPJP) and the Convention patriotique pour le salut Wa Kodro (CSPK). Two 
other groups joined the ranks of the Séléka namely the Front démocratique du 
peuple Centrafricain (FDPC) and a Chadian group called the Front populaire 
pour le redressement (FPR). These groups are mainly from the restive 
North East of the CAR, a region that is geographically isolated, historically 
marginalised and almost stateless. Within the ranks of the coalition were 
also Islamic jihadists from Chad and Sudan. Fighters of the LRA also joined 
the Séléka rebels in the capture of the government of the CAR (Central 
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African Republic Conflict 2012 to Present; Miles 2013; Vircoulon 2013; 
Urgent Humanitarian Needs 2013; Looming Food Crisis 2013; Seleka 
Rebels in the Central African Republic 16 May 2013). Prior to their defeat of 
the government of Bozizé, they received support from armed fighters from 
neighbouring Sudan known as the Janjaweed which has been accused of 
committing atrocities against civilians in the Darfur region (Larson 2013). 
The road to the Séléka rebellion is in fact an effect of the CAR Bush 
War that lasted from 2004 to 2007. The war started barely one year after 
Bozizé seized power in a military coup while president Patassé was attending 
a summit in Niger. This Bush War started with a rebellion organised by 
the UFDR in North Eastern CAR led by Michel Djotodia. The war soon 
escalated into a major fighting where the UFDR forces fought against the 
CAR government together with other rebel groups located in other parts of 
the CAR. These other rebel groups included the Groupe d’action patriotique 
pour la liberation de Centrafrique (GAPLC), the CPJP, the L’Armée populaire 
pour la restauration de la république et la démocratie (APRD), the Mouvements 
des liberateurs Centrafricains pour la justice (MLCJ) and the Front démocratique 
Centrafricain (FDC). The combined attack on the new government of Bozizé 
from these groups led to the displacement of thousands of people for about 
three years (Central African Republic Conflict 2012-Present). In spite of a 
peace agreement between the Bozizé government and the CPJP to end the 
Bush War, political violence continued, especially in the Eastern and Central 
regions of the CAR. It was clear that the legitimacy of the government of 
Bozizé was seriously challenged by the other armed groups that refused to 
sign a peace agreement with the government. As long as the government 
did not suppress these groups nor provided uncontested leadership of the 
country, it was clear that from its very inception in 2003, it was doomed for 
failure in the future. 
The insurgency of the Séléka took on a very militant phase in 
December 2012. Among the reasons that were advanced by the rebel groups 
for waging war against the government, it was included the argument that 
there was no solution to the problem of the armed groups of North Eastern 
CAR, human rights abuses, the lack of a programme of disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) for the fighters as well as a crippled 
security system in the country. The disarmament of the fighters had been 
planned since the agreements of Libreville in 2007 and 2008, but this was 
never implemented due to the lack of political will of the Bozizé regime. 
For example, the agreements between the government and the rebel groups 
included financial support and other assistance for insurgents who laid down 
their arms (Central African Republic Déja-Vu 2008; Urgent Humanitarian 
Needs 2013; Miles 2013; Boas and Hentz 2013: 2; Seleka Central Africa’s 24 
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March 2013; Central African Republic 10 May 2013; Ngoupana 2013). 
 The Séléka leadership also claimed that they were fighting because 
of a lack of progress after a peace deal, which ended the 2004-2007 Bush 
War (Central African Republic Conflict 2012-Present). A Catholic Bishop 
Mgr. Aguirre Monus, however, argued that the main goal of the Séléka 
coalition was to overthrow the government and to impose a regime of 
Islamic imprint. He contended that a majority of the people who belonged 
to the coalition were jihadists who spoke Arabic, killed and raped civilians, 
looted homes and Christian missions that were not mosques (Africa/Central 
African Republic http://www.news.va/thepopeapp/). Although the bishop 
saw in the Séléka a jihadist group fighting to impose Islam in the CAR, the 
coalition is more complex in its objectives and membership than simply 
religion. Whatever the case, only time will tell whether the argument of the 
bishop and other observers is true. Besides, only 15 % of the population of 
the CAR is Muslim (Azikiwe 2013). A majority of the population adhere 
to other religious groups, notably the Protestant, Catholic and indigenous 
religions. This alone was enough to deter the Séléka coalition from imposing 
a theocratic state in the CAR, and, since the departure of Michel Djotodia, 
the Muslim/Christian conflict has continued. 
In spite of the argument of the Séléka to justify the insurrection in 
the CAR in 2013, there are contrary opinions as to their real motivation. 
For example, according to Alex Vines of Catham House, a London-
based institute that studies international affairs, the actions of the Séléka 
were based purely on ambition. He states that “all accounts of the Séléka 
are that they have no development vision for CAR. It’s exclusively about 
redistribution of patrimony from having captured the state” (Associated Press 
April 1 2013). This argument could be supported by the attitude of the elite 
of the country. None of these elite, who have been accused of war crimes 
or other problems, has ever been killed in the process. The same elite who 
become government ministers today are rebels tomorrow fighting against 
the government and the state and going free. It is also difficult to explain 
the impunity with which successive governments privatise the state and its 
resources to members of their ethnic group or to a few privileged ones to the 
extent that, after their defeat, the next government is held hostage by ethnic 
loyalties and previously privileged groups. With the complex interplay of 
issues one can only partially agree with Alex Vine’s argument that the Séléka 
coalition wanted participation or complete control of the redistribution of 
the resources of the country by leading it. 
There were other reasons for the emergence of the Séléka in the 
CAR and the war it waged on the government of François Bozizé. For a 
long time there was a lack of governance in the Vakaga and Haute Kotto 
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administrative regions of the North; the permeable borders and widespread 
contraband of weapons and other goods in this region constituted a perfect 
environment for the emergence of the Séléka coalition. Other grievances 
of the people that led to a Séléka insurgence on the government included 
Bozizé’s imposition of his relatives in the transitional government, his 
rearmament through the purchase of helicopters and his delay in releasing 
political prisoners as agreed by during the accords with the opposition. Séléka 
militants also demanded the withdrawal of South African troops, which 
were deployed in Bangui in 2012 due to an agreement between the South 
African government and that of the CAR. The rebels were also encouraged 
by the fact that regional peers in Central Africa, during the Libreville peace 
talks, blamed Bozizé for closing down political space and dialogue with 
the opposition. Prove of this was seen in the fact that the multinational 
CEMAC force in the CAR FOMUC did not intervene when the rebels moved 
towards and took over Bangui (Vircoulon 2013; Central African Republic 12 
March 2013). There was therefore a generalised atmosphere of uncertainty 
considering the non-implementation of the Libreville Accords, with each 
party blaming the other for failuring to implement it. The Séléka coalition 
took advantage of this and other grievances to launch a sustained attack on 
the government from December 2012, leading to yet another peace deal or 
cease-fire on 11 January 2013.
The Séléka strong showing against the government of Bozizé, from 
late November 2012, forced the government to the negotiation table once 
more in January 2013. This was more so because, between December 2012 
and January 2013, the war had led to a looming food crisis because of the 
hike in prices, among other consequences. On 11 January 2013, a ceasefire 
agreement was signed in Libreville Gabon through the mediation of 
CEMAC. Following the agreement, the Séléka coalition dropped its demand 
for the resignation of François Bozizé. The president on his part agreed to 
appoint a Prime Minister from the opposition by 18 January 2013. In keeping 
with the agreement, Bozizé appointed Nicolas Tiangaye as Prime Minister 
in replacement of Faustin-Archange Touadéra. Senior Séléka leader Michel 
Djotodia became the Defence Minister. To enforce the ceasefire agreement, 
foreign troops, including those from South Africa, were deployed to help 
enforcing the peace deal. 
In spite of these appointments and the deployment of foreign 
troops to assist in bringing back the CAR to the path of peace and stability, 
the ceasefire was broken barely six days later with each party accusing the 
other of not respecting it (BBC News 21 March 2013). In March, the Séléka 
recalled Djotodia and four other Ministers from the transitional government 
and asked for the withdrawal of the South African National Defense Forces 
52
The Séléka insurgency and insecurity in the Central African Republic, 2012 - 2014
(SANDF), which was protecting Bangui, the capital of the CAR. This was a 
clear indication of the collapse of the January ceasefire agreement and also 
a challenge to the continuous rule of Bozizé, although the coalition had 
agreed, during the ceasefire agreement of January 2013, to Bozizé’s rule 
until the 2016 elections. It was also an indication of the misgivings that 
had developed within the ranks of the Séléka. Some military commanders 
of the coalition felt that Djotodia had negotiated an agreement too quickly 
with Bozizé to his own private and not the collective interest of the fighters 
(Vircoulon 2013; Besseling 2013).
The withdrawal of Djotodia and four other coalition Ministers from 
the government was the beginning of a war of failure for the government of 
Bozizé and success for the rebel coalition. Things moved on rather fast and 
not in favour of the government of Bozizé. The coalition multiplied attacks 
on key towns and cities and brought them under their control. Bangui, the 
capital of the CAR, finally capitulated on 24 March 2013, and President 
Bozizé escaped to Cameroon. Later that day, Michel Djotodia declared 
himself President of the country and the constitution and the national 
assembly were suspended and dissolved, respectively. He pledged to respect 
a peace deal that was signed earlier in 2013. Earlier, he had declared that he 
would rule the country for three years and, thereafter, organise elections. 
Following the coup, the borders of the CAR were closed with neighbouring 
countries. The government of Djotodia was condemned by member states 
of CEMAC (Global Times 2013), but paradoxically called for the formation of 
an inclusive transitional council and the holding of elections in 18 months 
and not three years as envisioned by Djotodia. The eventual putting in place 
of a transitional parliament of 105 members, and their election of Djotodia 
as the only candidate who had earlier declared himself president, led to the 
tacit recognition of the government by African leaders. Djotodia was the 
first CAR president from the remote, neglected and largely North East.
In order to stamp his authority on the country after the ouster of 
the government of Bozizé, the new military leader of the CAR, Djotodia, 
on 31 March 2013, named a government. This government consisted of 
nine members of the Séléka. There were eight representatives of parties 
that opposed Bozizé while he was in office and one of the members of 
government was associated with the government of Bozizé. Sixteen positions 
were reserved for the representatives of civil society, but the opposition to 
the Séléka government argued that these were actually disguised allies of the 
Séléka (Central African Republic Conflict 2012-Present). The government of 
Michel Djotodia found the myriad of problems of the country a ‘hot potato’, 
which explains why together with pressure from the ECCAS and France his 
government was forced to resign. The departure of Djotodia on 10 January 
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2014 has not lessened the conflict in the CAR. It has, instead, exacerbated the 
fracas between the mostly Muslim Séléka and Christian anti-Balaka groups. 
This is partly because, during the reign of Djotodia, many Christians were 
targeted and, when Samba-Panza took over, Christians are now retaliating 
(Deutsche Welle 2014; Global Post 2014; Handy 2014; Krumova 2014; Neill 
2014; Ottaro 2014). 
Soon after the Séléka coalition took over the leadership of the CAR, 
its fighters went on a rampage, executing opponents, raping women and 
looting homes. They also recruited children and also kidnapped vulnerable 
people. The fighters, particularly targeted members of FACA, and many 
killings, occurred in the urban areas in broad daylight. Commanders of 
the coalition seemed unable to maintain discipline within the ranks of the 
Séléka fighters (Ngoupana 30 March 2013; Ngoupana 16 April 2013; Vatican 
Radio 16 May 2013; Reuters 10 May 2013). Contrary to the Kimberley Process 
that calls for the origin of diamond sold in the world market to be made 
known, Séléka elements were very deeply solidifying their control of the 
lucrative diamond industry and were selling some of the stones (Larson 
2013; Seleka Rebels Gain Control 11 May 2013) rather illegally. 
In the midst of outrage against the excesses of the Séléka fighters, 
Djotodia created a National Commission of Inquiry to investigate and 
report on crimes and human rights abuses committed in the CAR since 
2002, including not only the regimes of Patassé, but also that of Bozizé 
(Reuters 10 May 2013). This can be considered as an evasive approach to the 
blatant human rights abuses of the coalition forces since March 2013. The 
establishment of a Commission of Inquiry by the Djotodia led-government 
was a way of buying time and laying the matter to rest. This could have been 
possible if this Commission of Inquiry succeeded to stamp its authority 
over the institutions of the state. It was also difficult for a coalition of forces 
with diverse agendas to work in a coherent manner because each of them 
wanted to reposition itself in the decision-making process of the country.
Other social problems that emerged from the Séléka insurgency in 
the CAR included insecurity in the health of the people, malnutrition. This 
was because of food insecurity, souring prices of scarce foodstuff, scarcity 
of clean and potable water. During the period of tension in Bangui, in April 
2013, only two hospitals were functioning. Schools were closed in the whole 
country and civil servants could not go back to work. The closure of the 
borders of the country by the new government had a devastating effect on 
the people because goods could not be imported from the port of Douala, in 
Cameroon. Douala is the main port for exports and imports of the CAR. One 
month after the military takeover in the CAR, motorbike taxi and bus drivers 
went on strike because of insecurity, extortion and violence against them 
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(Africa/Central Africa Fides.org). These were some of the signals which 
indicated the enormous challenges that awaited the Séléka led government. 
These and other challenges explain why there is still unfinished business 
in the CAR, which needs to be addressed by the government of Catherine 
Samba-Panza, successor of Michel Djotodia. 
Unfinished business and future of the CAR
If one goes by the arguments that were raised by the Séléka fighters 
to justify the armed insurrection against the government of Bozizé, the 
arguments raised by Catherine Samba-Panza and the still serious socio-
political instability in the CAR, there is need to rethink the future of the 
CAR. The year 2013 ended on a negative note for the CAR and explained 
why during the Sixth ECCAS Summit of Heads of State and Government, 
held in Chad from 8-11 January 2014, pressure was brought to bear on 
Michel Djotodia and his Prime Minister, Nicolas Tiangaye, to resign (Global 
Post 2014; Handy 2014). The reins of power in the CAR went to Catherine 
Samba-Panza in late January 2014. In spite of this, the security situation 
remains fragile with undisciplined and disgruntled former rebels roaming 
the capital and smaller towns at night, looting, raping and killing with 
impunity. Matters are compounded by the fact that people with Islamic 
sounding names pay more at roadblocks which have been erected in the 
southern and western parts of the country. People from the North East of 
the CAR increasingly find it difficult to obtain national identity documents, 
which is frustrating (Krumova 2014). Another serious security challenge for 
the transitional government of Samba-Panza is the passivity of the armed 
forces and police in the face of the violence which has sparked popular 
frustration and resentment. The concerns that anti-balaka elements are 
infiltrating the army are bad news because this will only further polarise the 
security situation in this country in this central African sub-region. Arms 
also continue to circulate thereby, creating fear and tension among warring 
groups (Chignac 2014). 
From 2013, child soldiers roam the streets and communities have 
lived in distrust and revenge because of past grievances (CAR Chaos 2013). 
The fractured Séléka forces continued to pursue and eliminate former 
members of the Forces armées centrafricaines (FACA) on the basis of their 
preparing for a return of the former president François Bozizé (Briefing 
2013). This might have been strengthened by the attacks on Bangui in early 
December 2013 by militias and other gunmen loyal to Bozizé. The attack 
resulted in the death of hundreds of people from gunfire, machete attacks 
and stoning (Hussain 2013). The security and administrative vacuum caused 
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by the escape of the remaining FACA troops, police and gendarmerie, as 
well as judicial and other civil authorities, contributed to the settlement of 
scores with impunity by members of the Séléka led government of Michel 
Djotodia. 
When Catherine Samba-Panza was elected on 20 January 2014 she, 
therefore, inherited a complex security situation which has continued. Anti-
balaka fighters today compose of people from rural areas. They carry with 
them traditional weapons and home-made guns and wear grigri (magical 
charms), convinced that these make them invisible and protected from 
bullets and rockets. Most of them are illiterate teenagers whose families 
have been killed and villages burned by the Séléka fighters. During the Séléka 
insurrection they virtually lost everything and are in Bangui to revenge. 
Apart from attacking the Séléka, they want them to be disarmed and call 
them “Arabs” (Vircoulon and Lesueur 2014; Katz 2014). This is just one out 
of the many human rights abuses in the country.
Other problems that have compromised a functional government 
in the CAR include the age-old issue of disarming, demobilising and re-
integrating Séléka combatants and former FACA. The cohesion that existed 
within the ranks of the Séléka coalition, prior to the overthrow of the former 
president, has dissipated and today there are rival groups even after the 
departure of Djotodia seeking to continue to control the affairs of the CAR. 
The Séléka is fragmented because its irregular forces have been accused 
of effectively creating a parallel army and police force in areas under its 
control. Several of their spokesmen have repeatedly called for the partition 
of the CAR into two states, namely a Muslim and a Christian state. Concern 
is also arising from the establishment of the new militia Organisation of 
the Central African Muslim Resistance (ORMC). This was set up by one 
of Djotodia’s former aides (Neill 2014). These developments are not aimed 
at seeking a lasting solution to the insecurity in the CAR, but to entrench 
positions and continue to plunder state resources under the cover of 
chaos. The visible cracks in the Séléka group have widened and each of the 
movements within the coalition is fighting more or less as an independent 
unit. The very tension between loyalists of Bozizé, those of Djotodia and 
what remains of the national army has only fuelled the Muslim/Christian 
conflict, leading to killings, destruction and people displaced within their 
own country (Vircoulon and Lesueur 2014). 
In Bangui, over 40,000 people are sheltered around the Bangui 
airport where the French established a base since 2002. Amnesty 
International has documented a lot of these problems, which have even 
hampered humanitarian assistance to people in need (Briefing, 2013; 
Moshiri 2013). Worst of all, it is clear that the country does not have a 
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functional government, although power has shifted from Michel Djotodia 
to Catherine Samba-Panza since January 2014. This was aptly captured by 
Mossiter (2014) when he described the government as being incapable of 
controlling anything but its own disbursement of favours. This precarious 
situation, which started with the overthrow of Bozizé, made the UN 
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to argue that “the transitional government 
is not properly functioning” (Kelemen 2013). 
The question of legitimacy and nepotism continues to be a serious 
issue in the struggle to bring peace to the CAR. Although the election of 
Samba-Panza was widely acclaimed for her strong personality, among other 
factors, it has been criticised for some of its actions. She has been accused 
rightly or wrongly for appointing friends and hang-ons as ministers. The 
daughter is said to be the Director of Cabinet (Mossiter 2014). The president 
herself acknowledged that her decision to appoint a majority of Ministers 
from her own Eastern Region stirred resentment in the country (Chignac 
2014). Former Presidents like Andre Kolingba, Ange Félix Patassé and 
Bozizé were similarly accused of nepotism and favouritism and they took 
these criticisms lightly only to be overthrown because of this and other 
factors. The future of the country which Samba-Panza herself acknowledges 
is in true national reconciliation, but how could this be realised if people 
who committed reprehensible acts are not pardoned, but punished as clearly 
stated by Catherine Samba-Panza in the same interview she granted?.
The problems of the CAR, which are indications of unresolved 
issues, have their basis in the history of the country. Since independence, 
many regulations that have been enacted are not properly enforced by 
the leaders. High-ranking dignitaries circumvent the rules because of the 
feeling that they are above the law. While the country has known internal 
political conflict since independence, there has been factional fighting 
from the late 1970s to the present. The state, for a long time, has been 
unable to guarantee the security of its citizens or its borders and armed 
groups freely move and according to their will across the border. Through 
the numerous conflicts in the country, over 103,153 people were internally 
displaced by 2011. It is a common saying in the country that “the state stops 
at PK 12”, which indicates that the official government reach and control 
does not extend beyond 12Km radius around Bangui, the capital of the CAR. 
This has led to the emergence of parallel structures replacing the failing 
state institutions in different parts of the country (Zafar and Kubota 2003; 
Unicef Central African Republic 2009; Frère 2010:3-10; Central African 
Republic November 2011; Bauters 2012) and, today, Bangui itself. Again, 
in the CAR, the rulers of today are the rebels of yesterday and former inner 
circle members who fell from grace and escaped to join rebel movements. 
57
Henry Kam Kah
It was clear from the beginning that the Séléka coalition could not tackle 
the problems of the CAR when the groups that constitute this coalition had 
different agendas. Today, after Djotodia, these groups are splintering and 
compounding the precarious security situation in Cameroon.
Another unfinished issue in the political evolution of the CAR is 
the differences that have existed over the years among the FACA, a small 
and ineffective force, made up of several branches which often perceive 
each other as rivals, the Presidential Guard being the best known and the 
Gendarmerie which operates on its own. In fact, rather than complementing 
the army, the gendarmerie has historically competed with it or with other 
government security agencies all of this for the president’s trust and support 
to the exclusion of the others. Since its creation, shortly after independence, 
the gendarmerie has at times functioned independently and at other times 
served under the chief of staff of the armed forces (Berman and Lombard 
2008, 15; Bauters 2012, 24). This is compounded by the proliferation of 
self defense groups. Whenever there has been a change of government, the 
military is affected. 
In the present circumstance, the Séléka fighters and anti-balaka are 
locked in battle and this has an impact on the country’s security system. 
Former FACA soldiers and others serving the government of Bozizè were 
either suppressed or forced to flee with weapons. This is a very serious 
problem because the security of the country can neither be ethnicised, as 
was done by Kolingba, Patassè and Bozizè, nor changed at will by those 
who seize power with a barrel of the gun. Soon after the Séléka took over 
control of Bangui, they began to attack and kill regular forces. The problem 
for this government is how to demobilise and re-integrate former fighters 
and former regular forces of the country. This was one of the reasons that 
led to their attack on the government of Bozizè and may well be ‘a bone on 
the neck’ of the new government of Catherine Samba-Panza, especially so 
because of the continuous fighting between competing forces. Although 
she vowed during her swearing in ceremony to “safeguard the peace, 
strengthen national unity, ensure the well-being of the Central African 
people, and conscientiously fulfil my work without ethnic, regional or 
religious considerations,” (Global Post 2014; The Guardian 2014) evidence 
points to a different situation, more complex than before. 
The fact that the Séléka is a coalition of groups from within and 
outside the CAR is a problem and is likely to be a source of disagreement 
between the leaders in the future. Experience shows that Bozizé seizure of 
power from Patassé was thanks to the support from rebel forces from Chad. 
When he took over control of the state he made use of Chadian fighters in 
his security. No sooner had he taken over, did the Bush War of 2004 to 2007 
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break out. Many of the former fighters were disgruntled with their non-
remuneration to the degree that they wanted and took to fighting against the 
government. Throughout the negotiations between the government and the 
rebels, the issue of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration became 
a thorny one. How could people be disarmed, demobilised and reintegrated 
when there were no safeguards for this to take place? Armed groups that 
fought against the government accused it of failing to make this happen. It 
remains a problem today, considering the emergence of different factions of 
the anti-balaka and the Séléka bent on excluding the other from the decision 
making processes of the CAR.
These problems in the last few months of 2013 resulted in the 
intervention of different actors. France has increased its troops in the country 
to provide “a minimum of security to allow for a humanitarian intervention 
to be put in place” (French Troops 2013). There is also a multinational force 
that would be led by the African Union to help restoring peace to the CAR 
and assist in rebuilding its institutions. The United States has authorised up 
to 100 million dollars in support of the AU forces on the ground. It has also 
airlifted Burundian forces to the multinational forces in the country. Appeals 
have been made to the European Union and the UN Security Council to act 
fast to stem the tide of a catastrophe in the CAR (Pellerin 2013; Kelemen 
2013). Today, thousands of troops are in the CAR under the coordination of 
MISCA, but in spite of their presence, the fracas continues in this country. 
Many more troops are needed to be redeployed to very volatile areas.
The formation of a government after an insurgency goes with 
agreements and disagreements within the belligerents and other forces 
eager to participate in governance. Following the military take-over in 
March 2013, and the transitional government that was formed, there are 
already dissenting voices condemning the distribution of positions. Many 
interpreted the government as an overwhelmingly one that led the Séléka 
regime to the exclusion of others. They are also criticising the government 
of Catherine Samba-Panza as not inclusive enough to heal wounds of 
bitterness and unite the people. Other voices argued that the attempt to 
expand power-sharing might actually end up sharing too much power to 
the instability of the state (Bekoe 2013). Fears were also expressed against 
Djotodia, accusing him of wanting to turn the CAR towards an Islamic state. 
The same could be said of the Christian president Samba-Panza, but the 
way the government responds to this and the way the ministers serve the 
population will determine subsequent response to it. The onus is, therefore, 
on these ministers and the entire cabinet to rise above sectarian interests 
and serve the country with the aim of bringing lasting peace and stability by 
working with the AU and the international community.  
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The way out of some of the problems of the CAR is to prevent 
disgruntled politicians from using newly formed armed groups; originally 
addressing local grievances to re-launch themselves into the political scene; 
and to develop functioning democratic institutions. There is also a need 
to address local grievances and develop faith in elected representatives of 
the people while restoring their dignity. It is also important for Catherine 
Samba-Panza to learn from the mistakes of past leaders and then forge 
new networks with the existing political elite to appease different ethnic 
interests and rally the population towards rebuilding a country destroyed 
by many years of insurgencies. She recognised this when she called on all 
and sundry to lay arms and help rebuild the country. Talking alone without 
concrete action will not solve the problem. Bekoe (2013) had argued that 
if some of these issues were considered, it would staff off a coup and also 
suggests that a critical partnership is necessary with the citizenry to inspire 
confidence and support. This can be made possible through earnest reform 
reconciliation and disarmament, which is, however, a problem, since the 
state is unable to make its presence felt in all the nooks and crannies of 
the country. Based on the sources of instability, the CAR government must 
truly engage in meaningful bilateral relations with neighbouring countries 
to handle the problems of refugees and other insurgent groups. This can be 
mutually beneficial if it establishes peace and tries to support these countries 
to solve their problems, because, by extension, it will be handling some of 
the complex problems associated with the instability in these neighbouring 
countries. In short, it will also be a way of solving some of the problems of 
the CAR. 
Conclusion
In this study, we have attempted to show that some countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa have a history of insurgency or civil unrest which has 
been a result of internal and external factors. Examples of these countries 
have been highlighted. While some of these countries have tried to solve 
these problems, others are still embroiled in insurgencies, rendering them 
more or less as failed states. The central African sub-region to which the 
CAR belongs has had its own fair share of these problems, which have been 
a source of insecurity and destabilisation, not only within, but also between 
countries of the region. 
The historical roots of the insurgency in the CAR have been traced 
in this study. The political instability and infighting in the country were 
introduced by the French and the Arab slave trade raiders in the area prior 
to the colonisation of the territory by the French. Groups were pitted against 
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one another and development was unequal, leading to problems for the 
country when it achieved political independence, in August 1960. The 
centralisation of the administration in the hands of a few elite followed the 
independence of the territory. The leaders ethnicised the state apparatus 
to the exclusion of other competent individuals from other ethnic groups. 
The result was frequent military coups and the problems of the country 
remained unattended to by successive regimes in the CAR. The grievances of 
the people accumulated and boiled over whenever there was an opportunity 
under the respective governments that ruled the CAR, especially from the 
late 1970s onwards. The 2012 to 2013 insurgency leading to the overthrow 
of the government of Bozizé, like other regimes before this, is rooted in the 
history of the creation and management of the CAR. Michel Djotodia found 
the potato too hot to handle and was pressured to quit. Now he watches the 
unfolding melodrama in his country from Benin. 
The study discussed the events leading to the Séléka seizure of 
power in the CAR. Several factors were responsible for the rebellion against 
the government which had their basis in the unfulfilled promises of the 
Bozizé government and the non-respect of the Libreville accords, among 
others. Although following a ceasefire agreement in January 2013, which 
saw the participation of the Séléka in the transitional government, they soon 
pulled out of the government in March 2013 and by 24 March 2013 they had 
seized power. We examine the context within which the Séléka government 
took over power and showed that there were still many unresolved issues in 
the CAR which the government of Catherine Samba-Panza must genuinely 
address before the country can move onto the path of peace, stability and 
national unity and integration. There must be a sustained and committed 
attempt to diagnose the problems of the country from the past regimes with 
a view setting up credible institutions and conducting a decent election in 
February next year. Anything less than this will be considered a child’s play 
which will only lay another foundation for the insurgency and insecurity 
that are now the trademarks of the CAR. 
REFERENCES
Africa/Central Africa-A Month after the Conquest of Bangui Rebels Contin-
ue to Vex the Population. Fides.org.
Africa/Central African Republic. “Seleka consists largely of jihadists, our 
Situation is Similar to that of Mali” Says the Bishop of Bangassou. 
http://www.news.va/thepopeapp/
Alusala, Nelson. 2007. “Armed Conflict and Disarmament: Selected Cen-
61
Henry Kam Kah
tral African Case Studies”. ISS Monographs Series (129) March.
“A Widening War around Sudan: The Proliferation of Armed Groups in the 
Central African Republic”, Sudan Issue Brief (5), January 2007.
Ayike, Margaret. 2005. “Protection against Human Rights Abuses in the 
Central African Sub-Region: The Case of Children.” In Central Af-
rica: Crises, Reform and Reconstruction edited by E.S.D. Fomin and 
John W. Forje (eds.), 189-209. Dakar: CODESRIA.
Azikiwe, Abayomi. 2013. “Seleka Rebels form New Government in the Cen-
tral African Republic.”, Global Research, 1 April.
Bangui Fighting between Seleka and Residents ‘Kills 17’. BBC News, 30 
March 2013.
Bangui Fighting between Seleka and Residents ‘Kills 17.’ BBC News Africa, 
15 April 2013.
Bassell, Sarah and Kelly Campbell. 2008. Toward Resolving Chad’s Inter-
locking Conflicts USIPEACE Briefing.
Bauters, Jasper. 2012. A Taxonomy of Non-State Armed Actors in the Cen-
tral African Republic. Interns and Volunteers Series, Antwerp.
Bekoe, Dorina. 2013. “Coup Proofing: Lessons from the Region for the Cen-
tral African Republic.” Africa Watch 1, June 6.
Berman, Eric G. and Louisa N. Lombard. 2008. The Central African Re-
public and Small Arms A Regional Tinderbox. Geneva: Small Arms 
Survey, Graduate School of International and Development Studies.
Besseling, Robert. 2013. CAR: Where Now for the Seleka Rebel Insurgency? 
Think Africa Press, 14 January.
Bøas, Morten and James J. Hentz. 2013. “African Security in 2013: A Year 
of Dis-equilibrium?”. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre 
Report, April.
“Briefing: Crisis in the Central African Republic”, Conciliation Resources, 
August 2013.
“Central African Republic: A State of Silent Crisis”, Medicins sans Frontieres, 
November 2011.
“CAR Chaos Escalates far Beyond Capital”, Aljazeera, 17 December 2013.
“Central African Republic: Catherine Samba-Panza Sworn in as CAR Inter-
im President.” http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/23/
catherine-samba-panza-sworn-in-central-african-republic, 14 June 
2014.
Central African Republic Conflict (2012-Present). 
Central African Republic Country Level Information.
62
The Séléka insurgency and insecurity in the Central African Republic, 2012 - 2014
Central African Republic Déja-Vu Peace (Dis)agreements that are Detri-
mental to Victims. International Federation for Human Rights No. 
513a, December 2008.
“Central African Republic’s Seleka Leader to Attend N’Djamena Summit”, 
Global Times, 2013.
“Central African Republic Seleka Rebels Seize Bangassou.”, BBC News, 12 
March 2013.
“Central African Republic Seleka Rebels “Seize” Towns”, BBC News, 21 
March 2013.
Chignac, Francois. 2014. “CAR President: Those Who Committed Rep-
rehensible Acts Will Answer for them.” http://www.euronews.
com/2014/02/11/central-african-republic-president-samba-pan-
za-those-who-committed-/, 16 June 2014.
Cilliers, Jakkie and Julia Schünemann. 2013. “The Future of Intrastate Con-
flict in Africa: More Violence or Greater Peace?” Institute for Security 
Studies Paper 246 May.
Country Profile Central African Republic.
Country Profile 2007 Central African Republic. London: The Economist In-
telligence Unit.
Crisis-Hit Central African Republic Elects First Female Interim President. 
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/africa/140120/
crisis-hit-car-gets-first-female-interim-president, 14 June 2014.
Debos, Marielle. 2008. “Fluid Loyalties in a Regional Crisis: Chadian ‘Ex-Lib-
erators’ in the Central African Republic.”, African Affairs, 1-17.
De Maio, Jennifer L. 2010. “Is War Contagious: The Transnationalisation of 
Conflict in Dafur.”, African Studies Quarterly 11, (4): 25-44.
Fomin, E.S.D. 2005. “Traumas, Memories and ‘Modern’ Politics in Central 
Africa.” In Central Africa: Crises, Reform and Reconstruction edited by 
E.S.D. Fomin and John W. Forje (eds.), 157-174. Dakar: CODESRIA. 
Forje, John W. 2005. “Rethinking Political Will and Empowerment as Miss-
ing Dimensions in Post-Conflict Reform and Reconstruction in the 
Central African Sub-Region.” In Central Africa: Crises, Reform and 
Reconstruction edited by E.S.D. Fomin and John W. Forje (eds.), 223-
240. Dakar: CODESRIA.
“French Troop Reinforcements Arrive in Central African Republic”, The Tel-
egraph, 21 December, 2013.
Frère, Marie-Soleil. 2010. “The Media and Elections in Post-Conflict Cen-
tral African Countries.” Paper on Conference on Election Processes, 




“From Mayor to Interim President of CAR: A Portrait of Catherine Sam-
ba-Panza”, http://www.dw.de/from-mayor-to-interim-president-of-
car-a-portrait-of-catherine-samba-panza/a-17376200, 16 June 2014.
Ghura, Dhaneshwar and Benoît Mercereau. 2004. “Political Instability 
and Growth: The Central African Republic”, IMF Working Paper 
WP/04/80.
Handy, Simon P. Alain. 2014. “Catherine Samba-Panza: New 
Hope for Central African Republic?” http://www.adja-
zeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/01/catherine-samba-pan-
za-new-hope-201412265942549291.html, 16 June 2014.
Hoslag, Jonathan. 2011. “China and the Coups: Coping with Political Insta-
bility in Africa.”, African Affairs, 1-20. 
Howe, Herbert M. 2001. Excepted from Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in 
African States, 1-27. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Hussain, Misha. 2013. “Central African Republic Violence Unabated De-
spite French African Military Presence”, AllAfrica Global Media, 19 
December.
IFAD’s Participation in the Debt Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Coun-
tries: Proposals for the Central African Republic and the Republic of 
Liberia and the 2008 Progress Report Executive Board-Ninety-Fifth 
Session Rome, 15-17 December, 2008.
“Internal Displacement in Central African Republic: A Protection Crisis”. 
Norwegian Refugee Council, Internal Displacement Monitoring 
Centre, 26 January 2007.
Joseph, Richard.  2012. Insecurity and Counter-Insurgency in Africa. The 
Brookings Institution, Africa Growth Initiative, 23-25.
Katz. Andrew. 2014. “Meet Catherine Samba-Panza, Central African Repub-
lic’s New Interim President.” http://world.time.com/2014/01/23/
meet-catherine-samba-panza-central-african-republics-new-inter-
im-president/, 16 June 2014.
Kelemen, Michele. 2013. “US Envoy: Time for Intervention in Central Afri-
can Republic.” NPR, 18 December.
Krumova, Kremena. 2014. “Ending Central African Republic’s Ethnic Vio-
lence: Can Interim President Catherine Samba-Panza Bring Peace?” 
http://www.thepochtimes.com/n3/498256-ending-central-afri-
can-republics-ethnic-violence/, 16 June 2016.
Larson, Krista. 2013. “In Central African Republic, Diamonds are Seleka 
Best Friend.”, Huff Post, 14 May.
64
The Séléka insurgency and insecurity in the Central African Republic, 2012 - 2014
Lenoir, Francois. 2014. “Central African Republic’s Interim President Cath-
erine Samba-Panza holds a News Conference during an European 
Union (EU)-Africa Summit in Brussels April 3 2014”, http://www.
reuters.com/article/2014/05/06/us-centralafrica-politics-idUS-
BREA450PS20140506, 14 June 2014.
“Looming Food Crisis in the Central African Republic”. IRIN, 22 February 
2013.
Marchal, Roland. 2009. « Aux Marges du Monde en Afrique Centrale…. » 
Les Etudes du CERI (153-154), March.
Mehler, Andreas. 2009. “Reshaping Political Space: The Impact of Armed 
Insurgency in Central African Republic.” Prepared for the III Euro-
pean Conference on African Studies, Leipzig, June, 2009.
Miles, Tom. 2013. “Insurgency Threatens Food Crisis in Central African 
Republic. World Food Programme”, Reuters, 15 February.
Moshiri, Nazanine. 2013. “Humanitarian Crisis Looms in CAR Capital.”, 
Aljazeera, 13 December.
Multidisciplinary Mission to the Central African Republic (CAR): A Tragedy 
in the Making? 4-11 November 2006.
Mwanasali, Musifiku. 1999. “Politics and Security in Central Africa.”, Afri-
can Journal of Political Science 4 (2): 89-105.
N’Ddiaye, Boubacar. 2007. “Beyond Demobilisation: Challenges and Op-
portunities for Security Sector Reform in the Central African Re-
public”, The World Bank, Working Paper (2), May. 
Neill, Ucko Hanna. 2014. “CAR Seleka Regroups: UN Deployment Can’t 
come Soon Enough.” http://africajournalismtheworld.com/tag/
catherine-samba-panza/, 14 June 2014.
Ngoupana, Paul-Martin. 2013. “Central African Republic’s Ex-Rebels went 
on Rampage: Rights Group.”, Reuters, 30 March.
Ngoupana, Paul-Martin. 2013. “Ex-Rebel Launch Reprisals in Central Afri-
can Republic Capital.”, Reuters, 16 April.
Ngoupana, Paul-Martin. 2013. “France Sends Troops to Central African Re-
public to Stem Rebel Insurgency.”, Reuters, 23 March.
Nossiter, Adam. 2014. “In Troubled States, New Governments with the 
same Old Problems.” http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/02/
world/africa/in-troubled-states-new-governments-with-the-same-
old-problems.html?r=0, 16 June 2014.
“Organised Crime and Instability in Central Africa: A Threat Assessment”. 
Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011.
65
Henry Kam Kah
Ottaro, Allen. 2014. “An Interview with Father Paterne Mombe, SJ, Coordi-
nator of the African Jesuit AIDS Network, about the Situation in the 
Troubled African Country.” http://www.catholicworldreport.com/
Item/3040/crisis and need in the central african republic.aspx, 14 
June 2014.
Pellerin, Cheryl. 2013. “Pentagon Continues to Ferry Troops, Equipment to 
Central African Republic.” US Department of Defense, 16 Decem-
ber.
Polity IV Country Report 2010: Central African Republic.
“Séléka, Central Africa’s Motley Rebel Coalition.” Global Post, 24 March 
2013.
Séléka Rebels Gain Control of Central African Republic’s Diamond Indus-
try, 11 May 2013.
“Séléka Rebels in the Central African Republic go on Rampage”. Vatican 
Radio, 16 May 2013.
Spittaels, Steven and Filip Hilgert. 2009. “Mapping Conflict Motives: Cen-
tral African Republic.” IPIS Antwerp.
Sudan Issue Brief: Human Security Baseline Assessment, No. 5, 2007.
Taylor, Ian. 2005. “Conflict and Violence in Central Africa: The Political 
Economy behind Internal and External Networks in Fomenting 
War in the Sub-Region.” In Central Africa: Crises, Reform and Recon-
struction edited by E.S.D. Fomin and John W. Forje (eds.), 241-258. 
Dakar: CODESRIA.
The Failed States Index 2007. The Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy Maga-
zine. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3865, 
July/August.
Unicef Central African Republic Monthly Report February 2009.
“UN: Central African Republic Security Deteriorating.”, VOA News, 16 April 
2013.
“Urgent Humanitarian Needs in Post-Coup Central African Republic”, 
IRIN, 4 April 2013.
Vircoulon, Thierry. 2013. “Failure Has Many Fathers: The Coup in the Cen-
tral African Republic.”, Africa Think Press, 28 March.
Vircoulon, Thierry and Thibaud Lesueur. 2014. “Central African Republic: 
The Third Government in Thirteen Months Get under Way.” http://
www.crisisgroupblogs.org/africanpeacebuilding/2014/01/21/cen-
tral-african-republic-the-third-gov’t-in-thirteen-months-gets-under-
way/, 16 June 2014.
66
The Séléka insurgency and insecurity in the Central African Republic, 2012 - 2014
“War Crimes in the Central African Republic: When the Elephants Fight, 
the Grass Suffers.”, International Federation for Human Rights (355), 
February 2003.
Zafar, Ali and Keika Kubota. 2003. “Regional Integration in Central Africa: 
Key Issues”. Africa Region Working Paper Series (52), June.
ABSTRACT
This study focuses on the historical roots of the Séléka insurgency in the Central 
African Republic (CAR), from December 2012 to March 2013, that culminated in 
the overthrow of Francois Bozizé and the taking over of the mantle of leadership of 
the country by the Séléka union or coalition led by its leader, Michel Am Nondroko 
Djotodia and then Catherine Samba-Panza. The roots of this insurgency and instability 
are traced to the past and to French administration in Equatorial Africa. The study 
specifically examines the internal dynamics that contributed to this insurgency, as 
well as the consequences for internal peace and stability. The data used for analysis 
in this study is basically secondary and tertiary in nature. We have reinterpreted 
and analysed this data in the context of the continuous insurgency, instability and 
disintegration that this has brought to the CAR and the Central African sub-region 
in general. The study concludes that the Séléka insurgency that led to the leadership 
change, in March 2013 and January 2014, in the CAR, is a result of a complex interplay 
of factors that have been and are likely to continue making the CAR a failed state, with 
repercussions on the people of the country and its neighbours.
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